The purpose of this article is to offer an analysis of the nature of contemporary legal power over the ending of human life in medical contexts. Drawing on Michel Foucault's characterisations of power relations in the sphere of life and death in
are to understand fully both the factors constitutive of legal power and the subtle, and often controversial, effects that flow from the manner in which it is exercised and asserted.
I Introduction
For a long time, one of the characteristic privileges of sovereign power was the right to decide life and death. (Foucault, 1978: 135) Deciding disputed matters of life and death is surely and pre-eminently a matter for a court of law to judge. (Re A (Children) , per Ward LJ) 1 The uptake of Michel Foucault's work on power in the social sciences has mainly been concerned with his notion of bio-power. Whether focussing on the disciplinary or bio-political sub-sets of bio-power, it has been what Foucault said about the power exercised over human life -how to manipulate it, monitor it, and make it more useful to the community -that has caught the attention of many social scientists. 2 While interesting, this concern is far from surprising. As the above quotation implies, Foucault considered the power to make decisions about the existence or destruction of human life an ancient right that no longer reflected the fact that it was life, and not death, around which modern power relations revolved.
In this article, I want to resurrect, and focus on, this question of the relationship between power and death. In particular, I seek to assess the usefulness of Foucault's characterisations of power relations -both his notion of the juridical or 'sovereign power' and his idea of bio-power -for thinking through the relationship 1 [2000] 4 All ER 961, at 968. 2 Some of the more prominent writers who have been influenced by this aspect of Foucault's work include Nikolas Rose (sociology; see, for example, Rose (2001) ), Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (political theory; see Hardt and Negri (2000) ), Giorgio Agamben (philosophy/political theory; see Agamben (1998) ), and Paul Rabinow (anthropology; see Rabinow (1999) ).
between contemporary legal power and questions about the ending of human life in medical contexts. In other words, I want to ask if Foucault's analyses of power, including those that concerned themselves with identifying the mechanisms through which societies sought to produce more useful human life, can assist us in understanding the manner in which contemporary law manages death in disputes arising in the field of medical practice. I will suggest that they can.
To date, the analysis of the nature of law's increasing power over the existence of human life in the medical context has tended to adopt a particular form. The guiding logic or mode of analysis of much of the academic literature on legal regulation, not only in this sphere but also across what may be described as the medical law field generally, is driven by a concern for ethics and ethical principles. 3 The form of inquiry usually undertaken seeks both to establish the degree to which the law recognises and implements various ethical valueshuman rights and autonomy are often marked out as particular favourites -and, to the extent that it fails to do so, to call for reform of the offending legal approach or practice. 4 While this type of analysis is by no means devoid of usefulness, implicit in it is a tendency to equate legal power with the degree to which it implements, or arrives at, 'correct' resolutions of ethical dilemmas. In the current context, at least, this tendency obscures from view the different types of power at work in the legal regulation of the existence of human life. Specifically, it fails to note and, therefore, to explain how certain institutional exigencies and practices within the common law shape the development and expression of those various modes of power. The source of legal power in this area is often not the ethical reasoning of judges; rather, it can be located in the more mundane practices and traditional techniques of common law reasoning. Thus, what follows is an attempt to expand the range of vantage points from which to reflect on, and understand, the nature of contemporary law's increasing involvement in regulating, or managing, the boundaries of human life in medical contexts. By doing so, I hope that some of the less obvious, but by no means less important, factors constitutive of that involvement can be brought into focus. It is my argument that
Foucault's work on power is a useful resource by which to conduct such an inquiry.
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While this study of the different types of legal power over the ending of human life forms the central focus of the article, this specific topic is indicative of a broader transformation that has been occurring over the last few decades -that is, the increasing role of law in managing various issues and conflicts arising in the field of medical practice. Consequently, it will be useful to preface the substantive analysis of the article with a brief discussion of the possible reasons behind this 5 It should be noted that aspects of Foucault's work have been deployed within the medical law/health care law field before. For a notable example, see Sheldon (1997) .
transformation. In section two, and in a very preliminary manner, I will suggest that what we are, and have been, witnessing is what Dingwall and Hobson-West have described as: 'the substitution of legalisation for medicalisation as the paramount mode of governmentality.' (Dingwall and Hobson-West, 2006: 41) I will argue that their analysis provides a convenient framework within which the substantive topic of this article is capable of being understood. In the third section, I will outline part of Michel Foucault's genealogical inquiries into power, and, more specifically, his characterisation of the changing nature of power relations over life and death. Thereafter, and by way of an analysis of two recent cases in the English courts, I seek to demonstrate how Foucault's notions of the juridical and bio-power can assist in identifying some of the characteristics of contemporary legal power over the existence of human life in medical contexts. 6 Despite the differences in the precise forms and modes of operation of power found to exist in each case, it is argued that the manner in which law asserts its power and function in both cases − stressing the objectivity and neutrality of the common law's practices − is similar. This legal assertion of power and function is, in itself, an important instance of power in that it works to obscure from view the often controversial consequences of the manner in which legal power is exercised in this area. Finally, I conclude by suggesting that, in order to grasp the type of hidden institutional power dimensions identified in this article, academic medical law must seek to expand the range of analytical tools which it currently deploys to explain and understand its object of research.
II SHIFTING MODES OF GOVERNMENTALITY: FROM MEDICALISATION TO LEGALISATION
How can we account for the emerging involvement of law in a number of issues and problems which, had they arisen in the past, would have fallen to be discussed and resolved within the province of medicine? Why, as Ward LJ's words above confirm, is law increasingly coming to be viewed as the preferred mechanism through which to settle disputes arising in the domain of medical practice? More broadly, what are the conditions responsible for this apparent shift in authority from medicine to law in contemporary Western societies? While it is impossible to address those questions adequately in this article, I do want to begin to think through the wider processes that may be responsible for the more frequent recourse to law in this area that we are witnessing today. Drawing on the work of Dingwall and Hobson-West in the field medical sociology, I will suggest that their identification of a shift from medicalisation to legalisation in contemporary Western societies provides, in general terms, a useful framework within which to comprehend the specific examples discussed in this article.
Mitchell Dean has observed that:
The capacity to manipulate our mere biological life, rather than simply to govern aspects of forms of life, implies a bio-politics that contests how and when we use these technologies and for what purposes. It also implies a redrawing of the relations between life and death, and a new 'thanato-politics', a new politics of death. (Dean, 2004: 16) Two points can be noted from this observation. (Foucault, 1978: 133-59 ' (1978: 136) Significantly, in such a society, the sovereign's right of death existed for the sole purpose of protecting and, therefore, sustaining his own life.
It is important to note that, even though the sovereign often deployed this right of force through the law, Foucault does not equate the notion of the juridical with law. Rather, it refers to a specific arrangement of power relations -one that he describes as 'deductive'. This top-down form of power relations manifests itself in various ways. Thus, as well as the seizure of life, it is intimately bound up with the prevention of certain acts and the permission of others. A specific threshold of individual conduct is established in advance and the freedom to act or not is determined by reference to this. Conduct which transgresses the threshold is prohibited; that which does not, is permitted. As Victor Tadros comments:
'Juridical power operated by defining a threshold between two fields of activity.
Either one had crossed the threshold or one hadn't.' (Tadros, 1998: 89) While not the sole prerogative of the legal field, historically the law played a significant role in defining the appropriate threshold beyond which certain acts were to be punished. Finally, it is important to stress that it is no part of Foucault's argument that the juridical notion of power relations no longer exists in modern societies; he simply believes that it no longer accurately reflects the main form of power relations in such societies -namely, bio-power.
According to Foucault, bio-power signalled a transformation in the 'mechanisms of power'. Since the classical age, 13 it is no longer the juridical form of power characteristic of the sovereign's right of life and death (either to destroy life or to allow it to continue) that predominates; rather, a multitude of forms of power comes into existence whose purpose is to shape, administer, and control human life in all its various manifestations. Life becomes something to be managed and directed, as opposed to simply allowed or ended. It is this positive, productive control of life, and not the right to kill (death), that defines the nature of bio-power.
And yet, as Foucault points out, this sustenance and shaping of life is not accompanied by the disappearance of killing; indeed, quite the contrary. What does alter, however, are the justifications for the exercise of the 'power of death'.
In the age of bio-power, killing is not carried out in order to protect the life of the sovereign but, rather, all lives -that is, the life of the population. In other words, the 'power of death' becomes directly linked to the central objective of bio-power − namely, 'the biological existence of a population.' Foucault succinctly sums up the nature of the transformation in power relations as follows: 'One might say that the ancient right to take life or let live was replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death.' (Foucault, 1978: 138) Bio-power took two different, but related, forms. 14 The first was known as disciplinary power. Its focus was the body. The purpose was to discipline this so that its utility could be maximised and its functional capabilities tailored to, and incorporated within, 'systems of efficient and economic controls ' (1978: 139) . In contrast to what Foucault calls 'penal law' -which was a type of juridical power that was administered in the course of judicial practice -disciplinary power was a 'nonjudicial power', exercised by various bodies, including medical, psychological, and psychiatric institutions (Foucault, 2001 : especially 52-89).
Characteristic of this form of power was the 'examination' -a process of supervision of individuals by, inter alia, doctors and psychiatrists that produced knowledge about those individuals:
A knowledge that now was no longer about determining whether or not something had occurred; rather, it was about whether an individual was behaving as he should, in accordance with the rule or not…This new knowledge was no longer organized around the questions: "Was this done? Who did it?"…[I]t was organized around the norm, in terms of what was normal or not, correct or not, in terms of what one must do or not do. 15 (Foucault, 2001: 59) In other words, rather than establishing whether individuals' specific acts had contravened rigid rules, it was who these individuals were and how they might act in the future that formed the focal points of investigation in disciplinary society.
The activity of defining thresholds gives way to the imposition of implicit norms of behaviour, character, and attitude that may or may not be met by the individual.
Rather than transgressing such norms, individuals will live up to them, or fail to do so, to varying degrees. The purpose of these various institutions was to 'train' the sick, the mentally infirm, and the criminals so that their future habitual actions would conform, or approximate as closely as possible, to 'society's' expected norms of behaviour. Tadros usefully identifies the crux of the difference between the juridical and bio-power in the following way: 'Power is not only preventative [the juridical], it is also creative [bio-power] or as Foucault would put it, it is not only deductive, it is also productive.' (Tadros, 1998: 77-8) Despite his statement that disciplinary power was a 'nonjudicial power', Foucault nevertheless envisaged consequences for law of the transformation in the 15 This type of analysis has been taken up by Nikolas Rose in his study of the social role of psychology and psychologists in the years immediately preceding World War II. Describing the function of what he calls 'the psychology of the individual', he says: 'Psychological agents and techniques are involved in assessment and diagnosis of problems of individual conduct in institutional sites such as hospitals, schools, prisons, factories and in the army.' (Rose, 1985: 1) He continues: 'Psychological knowledge of the individual was constituted around the pole of abnormality…This psychology sought to establish itself by claiming its ability to deal with the problems posed for social apparatuses by dysfunctional conduct. ' (1985: 5) concept of power relations from the juridical to bio-power. Given their importance in the current context, it is worth quoting his reflections at length:
Another consequence of this development of bio-power was the growing importance assumed by the action of the norm, at the expense of the juridical system of the law. Law cannot help but be armed, and its arm, par excellence, is death; to those who transgress it, it replies, at least as a last resort, with that absolute menace. The law always refers to the sword. But a power whose task is to take charge of life needs continuous regulatory and corrective mechanisms. It is no longer a matter of bringing death into play in the field of sovereignty, but of distributing the living in the domain of value and utility. Such a power has to qualify, measure, appraise, and hierarchize, rather than display itself in its murderous splendor…I do not mean to say that the law fades into the background or that the institutions of justice tend to disappear, but rather that the law operates more and more as a norm, and that the judicial institution is increasingly incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative, and so on) whose functions are for the most part regulatory. (Foucault, 1978: 144) Thus, for Foucault, the era of bio-power does not signal the irrelevance, or 'death', of law; nor does it spell the end of law's traditional association with the juridical notion of power relations. Rather, the point is that the law's function partially adapts in order to align itself with the logic of power (measurement, appraisal, normalisation) characteristic of bio-power. It begins to perform a more positive, regulatory, and productive role, rather than remaining exclusively bound to its traditional deductive, juridical function.
In what follows, I will try to demonstrate how Foucault's two notions of power relations (the juridical and bio-power) offer useful tools by which to think through the function and power of contemporary law as manifested in two recent cases concerning the ending of human life in the medical context.
IV Life, Death, and the Juridical Nature of Legal Power
If there is a case that illustrates the juridical nature of contemporary legal power in the area of life, death, and medical practice, then Re A (Children) is it. 16 The judgment of Ward LJ in the Court of Appeal not only makes us aware of the selfproclaimed privilege of law in managing contested questions surrounding the ending of human life; it also offers insights into the character of legal power that manifests itself in the course of such management. In this section, I will argue that aspects of Foucault's analysis described above provide us with tools by which to comprehend an instance of law's power over life and death. In doing so, however, I will suggest that it is death and his notion of the juridical -the two elements that Foucault envisaged as being of diminishing relevance in the age of bio-power -that are of most value here. Before that, though, it is necessary to set out, briefly, some of the background to the case and the manner in which
Ward LJ arrived at his decision.
Given the amount of discussion this case has engendered in both academic and non-academic circles, its facts are generally well known. Consequently, only a short summary of these -in the words of Ward LJ -is required:
Jodie and Mary are conjoined twins. They each have their own brain, heart and lungs and other vital organs and they each have arms and legs. They are joined at the lower abdomen. Whilst not underplaying the surgical complexities, they can be successfully separated. But the operation will kill the weaker twin, Mary. That is because her lungs and heart are too deficient to oxygenate and pump blood through her body…She is alive only because a common artery enables her sister, who is stronger, to circulate life sustaining oxygenated blood for both of them…[I]f the operation does not take place, both will die within three to six months, or perhaps a little longer, because Jodie's heart will eventually fail. The parents cannot bring themselves to consent to the operation. The twins are equal in their eyes and they cannot agree to kill one even to save the other. The doctors are convinced they can carry out the operation so as to give Jodie a life which will be worthwhile. So the hospital sought a declaration that the operation may be lawfully carried out. Johnson J. granted it…The parents applied to us for permission to appeal against his order [and] [w]e have given that permission. The 'situation' he talks about is that of the twins themselves and not the disagreement between their parents and the hospital staff. Accordingly, he was required to identify a relevant legal principle that could be applied to the twins'
'unique' situation. It was this -'the search for settled legal principle' and its application to resolve the case -and not the ins and outs of moral philosophy and/or applied ethics, that Ward LJ had found 'especially arduous'.
In performing this function, he began by pointing out that, in cases involving children, the relevant legal principle was that of the welfare of the child and that this had to be the court's paramount consideration (Children Act 1989, section 1(1)). However, this particular case posed a problem for the application of the welfare principle as the nature of each twin's interests differed and, consequently, (Foucault, 1978: 144 predicament and views, or to refuse to make a decision at all, needed to be resisted stubbornly by re-emphasising some central tenets of common law reasoning. Thus, the overriding judicial function was to discover, in the canon of the common law, the relevant legal principles that could be applied to resolve the case and to produce the correct legal answer:
They [cases where providing or withholding medical treatment is a matter of life and death for the incompetent patient] are always anxious decisions to make but they are invariably eventually made with the conviction that there is only one right answer and that the court has given it.
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This emphasis on resolving the situation, on arriving at an answer, was a crucial factor in the case. As we saw earlier, Ward LJ couched this institutional exigency in terms not only of right, but of judicial duty too. The judiciary could not, for lack of a relevant legal principle, simply refuse to make a decision; in order to meet its responsibilities, it had to find the relevant legal principle, apply it to the circumstances of the case, make a decision, and, one might add, be seen to do so.
In concrete terms, this need to sustain the institutional practices and exigencies The first 'suppressive' feature relates to the views expressed by the twins' parents. They had been unable to consent to the operation necessary to separate the twins mainly for the following reason:
"We cannot begin to accept or contemplate that one of our children should die to enable the other to survive……Everyone has the right to life so why should we kill one of our daughters to enable the other to survive……We have faith in God and are quite happy for God's will to decide what happens to our two young daughters."
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While Ward LJ took care to describe the parents' views at length, his following conclusion on these illustrated the unequivocal power of law in cases of life and death:
In my judgment, parents who are placed on the horns of such a terrible dilemma simply have to choose the lesser of their inevitable loss. If a family at the gates of a concentration camp were told they might free one of their children but if no choice were made both would die, compassionate parents with equal love for their twins would elect to save the stronger and see the weak one destined for death pass through the gates. However, to confine the explanation of this negation to the level of the purely moral, fails to take account of how the judge's words sit in, and indeed are a product of, the institutional context within which they are uttered. Discussing the same quotation, Scott Veitch has argued that:
The two objective, universalised, values or norms -Ward LJ's and the parents' -may conflict in an incommensurable way -that is, in such a way that to make them commensurable would fundamentally misunderstand and destroy the meaning and practice of one of them -yet, and this is the key point, the legal institution cannot countenance incommensurables. Its decisionistic imperative and its social priority impel it to commensurate, and for this reason the law cannot truly countenance, cannot bear, the tragedy thrown up by the situation. It must resolve it, and this is the particular force of law. (Veitch, 2006. My emphasis) In other words, as a simple moral conflict, the clash of values arising from the parents' views and those of Ward LJ is irresolvable without negating the meaning of either, or even both, views. However, given the particular context within which the conflict exists, it cannot be left to fester. As we saw earlier in relation to the law's exercise of its 'right of death', in order to satisfy the common law's need for finality, a decision must be made. But rather than speak of 'resolution', there is just plain suppression of the parents' views and values. Indeed, the unwillingness of the Court to focus on trying to resolve the original conflict before it -that between the parents and the medical staff -results in the need to create an artificial conflict (between the twins themselves) capable of resolution by the application of legal principle (the least detrimental alternative). The difficulty of applying this principle to the parents' views (their religious views meant there was no alternative, far less a least detrimental one, open to them), means that these must simply be negated. In order for the judiciary to do its work properly, and uphold a central tenet of common law reasoning, some sort of imbalance in the circumstances before the Court must exist (a 'lesser of their inevitable loss') to which the legal principle can concretely be applied to resolve. As such, the intransigent moral reasoning behind the parents' views had to be met not merely by counter-moral argument, but by the unequivocal, juridical power of the law. something that ought to be revealed or that may be understood from the context.
In other words, while those broader questions may be thought to be integral to the nature of the case, no space is provided in the course of the hearing for the debate and disagreements they engender to be played out.
It should be pointed out that this suppression of those central underlying issues does not mean that decisions are not being made about them; they clearly are. It simply means that those decisions are obscured from view by the emphasis that is placed on legal precedent and the need to search for, and identify, the appropriate legal principle to be applied to the 'conflict' between the twins.
Indeed, it might be thought that the precise effectiveness of this technique of common law reasoning in the case lies in its ability to render invisible, and therefore immune to criticism, the fact of the Court's involvement in making controversial decisions about fundamental issues over which there is legitimate disagreement, but without that disagreement being played out in the legal forum.
Furthermore, whatever the broader reasons for the increasing invocation of law as a means of settling disputes about life and death arising in the field of medical practice, the very naturalness of law's appropriation of those disputes, and their consequent subjection to techniques and exigencies of common law reasoning that are held out as being objective and neutral, makes it much less likely that this appropriation and subjection, and their consequences, will attract debate or criticism. 33 This is because courts of law would appear to be the self-evident social arbiters of such sensitive disputes. Their practices and the expertise of their personnel in matters of dispute resolution lend an unquestioned air of legitimacy to Ward LJ's authoritative claim to legal power over life and death.
One of the consequences of this state of affairs is that academic criticism of legal 33 This is not to say that there has been no criticism of law's involvement in 'life and death' cases. In the context of Re A (Children), for example, John Harris touches upon the question of how we might usefully decide such cases. However, rather than fundamentally questioning the role of law, or the structural features of common law reasoning, Harris, as one would expect (given he is a moral philosopher), critically analyses the ethical reasoning of the judges. See Harris (2001) . including the need to search for the correct legal principle to apply to the situation the Court defines as requiring resolution, and the judiciary's obligation to arrive at a final answer, rather than refusing to decide the case at all.
Finally, I noted how some of the less apparent juridical effects were masked by the ways in which law's power was both asserted and functioned -that is, as an authoritative claim to sovereignty over disputes about life and death, and by means of objective modes of legal reasoning. These modes of assertion and functioning not only produce the 'masking' effect just described; they also undercut the likelihood of critical analysis, because they are assumed to be the natural mechanisms by means of which to settle disputes over life and death in the medical context.
V Law, Discipline, and Productive Power
In this section, I seek to demonstrate how contemporary legal power over the existence of human life in the medical context can be interpreted as disciplinarythat is, as exhibiting one aspect of Foucault's bio-power. In order to do so, I will take as my focal point the recent case of Re B (an adult: refusal of medical treatment). 34 But while I will argue that it is possible to differentiate the ways in which legal power operates in Re A (Children) and Re B, I also want to emphasise the similar way in which the court's function is asserted in both cases.
In other words, despite the existence of a different mode of operation of power (disciplinary power) in Re B, the High Court's assertion of its function as a neutral arbiter that, by stressing the need to focus on technical legal tests and precedent, makes no 'value' judgment on the course of action proposed by the woman at the centre of the case -Ms B -exhibits close parallels with Ward LJ's approach to legal reasoning in Re A (Children).
The case arose out of the unwillingness of clinicians caring for Ms B -who had become a tetraplegic as a result of a haemorrhage of the spinal column in her neck -to comply with her request not to be kept alive by means of artificial ventilation. This unwillingness did not arise because Ms B was found to lack the requisite mental capacity to make a decision to refuse medical treatmentindeed, it was decided that she did have such a capacity; rather, the clinicians' refusal to comply with her wishes stemmed from the fact that what they were being asked to do contravened one of the central tenets of their professional practice -that is, to strive to maintain human life. In these circumstances, Ms B sought the intervention of the High Court. Specifically, she asked the Court to declare that she did, indeed, have the necessary mental capacity to refuse medical treatment, and that the maintenance of the artificial ventilation constituted a trespass to her person. The Court held that she had the requisite mental capacity described and that the NHS hospital trust concerned had acted unlawfully by failing to resolve the dispute over Ms B's predicament expeditiously.
The objective of the common law test for mental capacity in such circumstances is to establish whether the patient has understood the nature, purpose, and effects of a proposed medical treatment. 35 If this understanding is found to exist, then the patient is declared to have mental capacity and, in law, can exercise his or her right to self-determination by demanding that his or her wishes are carried out. 36 The legal test for mental capacity itself is invariably held out by members of the judiciary as a technical or scientific procedure, with the necessary assessment that it entails often best performed by medical experts, especially psychologists and/or psychiatrists. Consequently, one of the test's main benefits is thought to be its objectivity, which, in turn, allows courts to create the impression of legal neutrality. In other words, it allows members of the judiciary to declare that they are neither involved in making value judgments about patients'
proposed courses of action, nor in making explicit decisions about life and death.
This, for example, is Butler-Sloss P's summary of her judicial function in Re B:
I shall…have to consider in some detail her ability to make decisions and in particular 35 For the specific factors a patient must demonstrate in order to be declared to have mental capacity, see Re MB (An Adult: Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FCR 541. The Mental Capacity Act 2005 -which received Royal Assent in April 2005, and is likely to come into force in April 2007 -essentially enshrines the test for mental capacity at common law in statute. See section 3 of this Act for the test to determine whether or not an individual is able to make a decision for himself or herself. 36 As the law will not force clinicians to provide medical treatment to patients that goes against the former's clinical judgment, in practice compliance with patients' wishes is confined to refusals of medical treatment.
the fundamental decision whether to require the removal of the artificial ventilation keeping her alive. It is important to underline that I am not asked directly to decide whether Ms B lives or dies but whether she, herself, is legally competent to make that decision.
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The sole concern of the judge, then, is not to make a direct decision about life and death, but to establish Ms B's mental ability to make a decision about medical treatment (to refuse it), the consequence of which will be death.
Morgan and I have argued elsewhere that this attempt to create a division within the judicial function between assessing the patient's mental capacity to make decisions regarding medical treatment (a proper role for courts) and assessing the nature of the patient's decision (effectively, a decision to die -an inappropriate function of the court) is untenable. (Morgan and Veitch, 2004: 116-20) The thrust of our reasoning for this contention is that the nature of patients'
decisions is a pre-requisite for the existence of tests for mental capacity. In Re B, Having answered the Court's questions regarding the reasons for seeking to have the ventilator withdrawn, Ms B was then judged on the standard of her responses, the nature of her demeanour, and the quality of her character:
Her wishes were clear and well-expressed. She had clearly done a considerable amount of investigation and was extremely well-informed about her condition. She has retained a sense of humour and, despite her feelings of frustration and irritation which she expressed in her oral evidence, a considerable degree of insight into the problems caused to the hospital clinicians and nursing staff by her decision not to remain on artificial ventilation. She is, in my judgment, an exceptionally impressive witness. Subject to the crucial evidence of the consultant psychiatrists, she appears to me to demonstrate a very high standard of mental competence, intelligence and ability.
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What one witnesses here is the type of inquiry that was really taking place during the Court's application of its test for mental capacity. The factors to which weight is attached are not confined to those necessary to demonstrate, for example, that
Ms B has weighed the treatment information she has been given, balancing risks and needs, in arriving at a choice (i.e. one of the requirements of the legal test for mental capacity). Rather, the Court is also concerned with her demeanour, her character, and her attitude. Who is she, and how has she conducted herself throughout? Given the esteem in which the professional practice that she is seeking to confront and undercut is held, it is clear that she must not only explain her decision clearly but exhibit additional factors and traits that reach unspecified levels of character and attitude. 39 The significance of this in the context of the case, however, is that the assessment of those traits impacts directly on the Court's function of deciding whether or not to allow death. What can be seen here is the expression in law of the results of a more general transformation that took place in medicine in the early part of the twentieth century. David Armstrong has described this transformation as follows: 'The medical gaze shifted from body to mind [during the 1920s]'. (Armstrong, 1983: 26) Importantly for the present discussion: 'The mind was represented to the gaze in words…The patient had to speak, to confess, to reveal; illness was transformed from what was visible to what was heard. ' (1983: 25) For a discussion of the emerging focus on the patient's personality and identity in medicine -as opposed simply to his or her body -see Armstrong (1983) : Chapters 11 and 12, and Armstrong (2002) Secondly, and as I have already noted, Foucault's notion of the disciplinary is intended to convey a productive, creative power. Its objective is to control and shape human life (specifically the human body) in order to inculcate certain standards of behaviour and levels of functioning. Thus, rather than death, biopower is squarely concerned with the development of useful human life. But as mentioned earlier, Foucault did not neglect the continued importance of death in the era of bio-power. He did, however, think that, rather than the direct taking of life associated with the juridical notion of power, bio-power could be described as 40 Or, as Nikolas Rose describes one aspect of our contemporary 'governmentality': '[individual] acts of free but responsibilized choice'. (Rose, 1999: xxiii) involving the disallowance of life to the point of death. While this phrase is somewhat cumbersome, what I simply wish to note from it is the clear distinction Foucault makes between a power that imposes death (the juridical) and one which -while bound up with producing death -does not directly impose it (biopower). I would argue that it is the presence of this latter type of power that one witnesses in Ms B's case. Unlike the situation in Re A (Children), in Re B there is no clear taking or seizure of life -no direct imposition of death -to speak of.
Rather, given the clinicians' emphasis on the preservation of life, their reluctance to perform an act that would result in death, and the Court's clear concern to respect those professional values, it is more useful to think of the case in terms of the allowance of death. Moreover, rather than taking centre stage, death lurks in the wings, kept firmly at arms' length and, as much as possible, out of the legal discourse. Indeed, it might be said that death is produced, or allowed, by way of a focus on life. For example, the types of character traits emphasised by the Court -humour, insight, intelligence -are more in keeping with one fully engaged in life, rather than someone contemplating death. There is a sense in which the justification for death must be found to lie in the more recognisable and positive features of life.
Finally, combining the foregoing points, it can be said that it is the knowledge acquired by the Court of who Ms B is, rather than any determination of whether her proposed course of action flouts a pre-constructed threshold of individual conduct, that forms the basis of how the Court manages its function of deciding this contested issue of life and death. Her 'examination' and the degree to which she is deemed to conform to unspecified norms of character and demeanour are directly relevant to the procedure by which the law allows death.
Consequently, the use of Foucault's work on life, death, and power in the current context can be read as a disturbance of his binary law-death-juridical and lawlife-disciplinary characterisation of power relations. In other words, what a case such as Re B illustrates is that, whatever the relevance of Foucault's notion of disciplinary power to accounts of the role of law in the production of more useful human life, it is also useful in explaining one of the ways in which law manages a significant contemporary function -that is, the production of death in cases arising from the field of medical practice.
If the manner in which power operates in Re B is disciplinary, the assertion of law's power and function (by way of its focus on legal tests of mental capacity) as objective and neutral works to obscure this. As Tadros says: 'Disciplinary power is ideally invisible in its application… [It] …attempts to cast light away from itself and onto the individual.' (Tadros, 1998: 90) It is possible to see this process at work in Re B. The manner in which the Court sets up its function -to determine if
Ms B has mental capacity -means that emphasis is, indeed, placed on the individual, in ways that can be thought to be both positive and neutral. In relation to the former, much is made of the importance attached by law in such cases to the autonomy of the individual -that is, her right to determine for herself whether to refuse medical treatment which is keeping her alive. Autonomy is invariably portrayed in the courts as one half of a polarised battle between itself and the sanctity of life principle. In the event of a contest between the two, it is settled law that, at least in the case of adults deemed to have mental capacity, the former is always victorious. But, as we have already seen, the emphasis on the individual is also intended to be neutral and objective through the application of a test for mental capacity that is concerned solely with the state of the individual's mindespecially her ability to understand and retain information about medical treatment, and to weigh that information in the balance when arriving at her choice. The objectivity that is held out as being inherent in this process is meant to prevent any judgmental reflection on the individual and her abilities. If mental capacity is found to exist, autonomy follows, and that is the end of the matter. It is also used as a mechanism by which the law seeks to distance itself from potential accusations that it is directly involved in making decisions about sensitive questions concerning the ending of human life. It needs the safety of a 'technical' procedure that will allow it to assert its function as distinct from the one it is actually performing. Like the Court of Appeal in Re A (Children), then, in Re B there is an institutional need for the law to define its role in neutral and objective terms.
As well as masking the existence of this disciplinary power, this assertion of the common law's objective and neutral function has also had an effect on the general nature of critical analysis in this area, and I will now reflect upon this as part of my concluding comments.
VI Conclusion
There can be little doubt that the relatively new academic discipline of medical law has been heavily shaped by ethical discourse. Whether it be, for example, West call the dominant mode of governmentality) behind the current tendency to view law as the most appropriate mechanism through which to settle our differences and conflicts. Thus, as well as acknowledging the significance of attempts made by law and lawyers to claim jurisdiction over traditionally medical issues, we must also try to account for law's more prominent role in terms, for example, of wider sociological changes and developments.
Secondly, by confining critical analysis of the law to the level of ethical discourse, and by placing faith in the ability of law to redress the apparent controversial exercise of medical power, the orthodox mode of critique in the medical law field fails to investigate the internal operation of legal power and the consequences that flow from that. In particular, its concentration on questions of ethics and 42 Insofar as the courts are concerned, we need look no further than Ward LJ's claim set out in the quotation at the beginning of this article for evidence of law's creeping jurisdiction in this area. As for the academics, it could be argued that the development of medical law as an academic subject has, at least in part, been driven by a desire to claim professional expertise over the variety of issues, problems, and dilemmas arising in the field of medical practice. Unfortunately, I do not have the space to advance this argument fully here.
ethical principle means that the integral role of the more mundane practices and techniques of the common law in the constitution and expression of legal power in this area is never really recognised or addressed. Their very obviousness and familiarity work to obscure the significance of their role from view. By deploying aspects of Foucault's work on power -specifically his notions of the juridical and the disciplinary -I have sought to offer a way in which these institutional mechanisms responsible for the subtle operation of power in one area of medical law can be grasped. So, for example, rather than concentrating on the ethical supportability or shortcomings of the outcome in Re A (Children), I found the main source of power in Ward LJ's judgment to lie in his concern to uphold traditional techniques of common law reasoning. These techniques were fundamental to both the identification of the conflict to be resolved and the exclusion of more fundamental issues and questions the case could be thought to touch upon. Similarly, the High Court's emphasis on the 'technical' legal test for mental capacity in Re B, helped to mask the controversial nature of the inquiry actually undertaken in the process of determining capacity. This demonstrates that the common law's engagement with the individual in this area is not confined to defending the patient against medical power by giving him or her more autonomy; rather, on the route to a finding of patient autonomy, law's power over the individual is more subtle and less uncontroversial than the rhetoric of patients' rights would have us believe.
With the increasing level of legal involvement in disputes arising from medical practice, there needs to be a more multi-faceted approach to power than currently exists in the academic medical law literature. In particular, it is necessary to acknowledge that power in this area does not exclusively revolve around questions of ethics or the relative authority of the legal and medical professions. Rather, one must also note the less obvious sources of legal power -the apparently neutral and objective institutional practices of the common lawand the subtle, but often controversial, effects that these produce.
